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BOOK REVIEWS
The New Ontario Limitations Regime: Exposition and Analysis, edit-
ed by Jacob Ziegel, Wayne Gray, Brian Bucknall and Lisa Kerbel
Caplan; executive editor, Melissa Krishna (Toronto, Ontario Bar
Association, 2005, xvi and 282 pp., $90)
In January 2004, Ontario's Limitations Act, 2002' came into
force. Thankfully, there is no limitation period on legislative
reform, as this relatively simple statute represented close to 100
years of law reform in the making. As Lisa Kerbel Caplan and
Wayne Gray note in their chapter on the impact of the new statute
on commercial transactions, the legislation "strikes a new balance
between the interests of the plaintiffs, the interests of defendants
and the goals of the judicial system".2 Elsewhere, in the Preface,
the editors refer to the act as a "radical break with traditional
concepts of limitations law as previously enacted in Ontario".3 The
main features of the new act include a general limitation period of
two years from the time a claim was or ought to have been discov-
ered and an ultimate limitation period of 15 years. The real ques-
tion the book sets out to address is whether this new legislation was
worth the wait, or whether the passage of the Act simply marks the
start of the next 100-year quest for limitations law reform. It is an
elusive question and one well served by the thoughtful and
thought-provoking analyses in these essays. This brief comment
elucidates the contributions of these essays as well as pointing out
some areas that merit further analysis.
The old Limitations Act,4 enacted in 1897, was an embarrassment
to a modem legal order. It employed anachronistic terms (for example,
the limitations act covering most litigation in tort or contract was
1. S.O. 2002, c. 24, Sch. B.
2. L. Kerbel Caplan and W. Gray, "Impact of the Limitations Act, 2002 on Commercial
Transactions, Lending and Debt Recovery", in Ziegel et al., eds., The New Ontario
Limitations Regime: Exposition and Analysis (hereafter Ontario Limitations Regime),
atp. 1.
3. Ontario Limitations Regime, at p. i.
4. R.S.O. 1990, c. L.15.
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denoted by the period of six years for an "action on the case"). As
the Ontario Law Reform Commission observed in a 1969 report
quoted by Tim Bates and Brett Harrison in their lucid historical
chapter, "[t]o the ordinary citizen, these laws are beyond compre-
hension".' Other kinds of common litigation appeared to be outside
the scope of the old act altogether (litigation on equitable grounds
such as breach of fiduciary obligation or unjust enrichment was
held by the Supreme Court to be outside the contemplation of the
act and therefore subject to no limitation period 6). There is likely
sufficient fodder for an entire separate volume simply chronicling
the failed attempts at legislative reform in the past.
7
Indeed, whether the new act represents law reform or should
more accurately be seen as judicial policy-making remains a live
and engaging question. Many key aspects of the act are derived
directly from the case law interpreting the old act and its compan-
ion acts around the country.' The centerpiece of the new act, as
noted by Tim Bates and Brett Harrison in their contribution to the
volume, is the codification of judicially developed principles of
discoverability. The critique of the absence of legislative leader-
ship and reliance on judicial interpretation is an underlying theme
of this volume as well. One of Jacob Ziegel's two contributions to
the volume takes the Ontario government to task for first shutting
down its Ontario Law Reform Commission in 1996 and in failing
to revive it since. In his view, this absence accounts for the inade-
quate law reform activity in Ontario in commercial and consumer
law areas. Ziegel and others, no doubt, took heart from the
5. Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Limitation of Actions (Toronto,
Department of the Attorney General, 1969) at p. 7, quoted in T. Bates and B. Harrison,
"The Impact of the Limitations Act, 2002 on the Common Law of Discoverability" in
Ontario Limitations Regime, at p. 80.
6. "The time for bringing a claim for breach of a fiduciary duty is not limited by statute
in Ontario." (M. (K.) v. M. (H), [1992] 3 S.C.R. 6 at pp. 7-8, 96 D.L.R. (4th) 289, per
La Forest J.)
7. The most notable of these is likely An Act to Revise the Limitations Act, which was
given first reading in November of 1992 before disappearing from view: Bill 99, 2nd
Sess, 35th Leg., Ontario, 1992. Three previous aborted legislative initiatives are
chronicled by Elizabeth Ellis and Eric Tilley in "Legislative History and the
Limitations Act, 2002", in Ontario Limitations Regime, at pp. 142-53.
8. See Bates and Harrison, supra, footnote 5, at pp. 77-80. For the leading case law, see
Central Trust Co. v. Rafuse, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 147, 31 D.L.R. (4th) 481, application to
vary judgment granted on rehearing [1988] 1 S.C.R. 1206 and Peixeiro v. Haberman,
[1997] 3 S.C.R. 549, 151 D.L.R. (4th) 429. For a more detailed review of the common
law, see Graeme Mew, The Law of Limitations (Toronto, Butterworths, 2004).
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Attorney General's announcement in January of 2006 that a new
Ontario Law Commission is to be established. As Ziegel readily
concedes, however, the output of the former Law Reform
Commission in areas of commercial and consumer activity often
had little or no impact on previous Ontario governments and result-
ed, in his words, in its proposals being "essentially ... allowed to
gather dust".9 It would seem that the limits of law reform in these
fields have more to do with political inertia than with an absence
of sound proposals.
In part because such occasions are rare, significant new legisla-
tion in commercial and consumer fields tends to attract some atten-
tion, as this volume reflects. The collection of papers that make up
this volume is divided into a wide array of categories, from papers
dedicated to specific sections of the act (such as s. 22, which pro-
hibits contracting out of limitation periods, or s. 23, which stipu-
lates that for the purpose of applying rules regarding conflicts of
law, limitation law is considered substantive law) to papers dedi-
cated to the impact of the act on particular fields of law (for exam-
ple, real estate law, consumer law and commercial debt law) to
papers on the law reform process and finally comparative papers
shedding light on the act either by looking at different legal regimes
(for example, the civil law in Quebec) or by looking at jurisdictions
like Alberta and British Columbia, which have analogous legisla-
tive language.
While the authors are generally supportive of the government's
long overdue law reform initiative in the field, the tone of the col-
lection is, on the whole, critical of the legislation, both for what it
includes and what it omits. Section 23 and its codification of the
principle from Tolofson v. Jensen' is the subject of an entertaining
but stinging analysis in Janet Walker's essay entitled "Twenty
Questions (About Section 23 of the Limitations Act, 2002)". This
chapter illuminates the significant uncertainty to which the mini-
malist provision directed at resolving conflicts with limitation periods
in other jurisdictions gives rise. Some of the most trenchant
9. J. Ziegel, "Law Making and Law Reform, and the Lessons of Section 22 of the
Limitations Act, 2002", in Ontario Limitations Regime, at p. 155.
10. [1994] 3 S.C.R. 1022, 120 D.L.R. (4th) 289. In this case, the court adopted the civil
law approach that once a limitation period had expired, the underlying substantive
right was extinguished, as opposed to the earlier common law approach which viewed
limitation periods as procedural and merely denied parties a remedy once the period
had tolled (but left the underlying substantive right in existence, if unenforceable).
2006]
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criticism is reserved for s. 22 which, as noted above, removes the
right of parties to contract out of limitation periods. John Cameron
concludes his unrelentingly negative view of this provision by
asserting, "There is no sound policy reason to preclude business
parties from defining the nature and extent of their contractual obli-
gations."" While this may be true, and while s. 22 may create sig-
nificant uncertainty, the volume might have been strengthened had
it included the government's own policy perspective. 2 Why was it
deemed important to remove the ability of parties to contract out of
limitation periods? Was it seen as a measure to protect vulnerable
consumers? This rationale is assumed in Jacob Ziegel's second con-
tribution to the volume, which considers the legislation from the
consumer perspective.' 3 Nonetheless, we are left in the dark as to
the government's own account of this policy trade-off.
Notwithstanding the merits of that trade-off, it would appear the
critics' lamentations (and those of industry lobbyists such as the
Ontario Bar Association) were heard. The Ontario government is
seeking to repeal much of the substance of s. 22 through its Access
to Justice Act, 2006, introduced in 2005. That legislation includes
the following provision amending the Limitations Act, 2002:
Limitation periods established by the Act currently apply despite agreements
to vary or exclude them. The only exception is for an agreement made before
January 1, 2004, the day the new Act came into force. The Schedule adds two
further exceptions for agreements made on or after the day the Bill receives
Royal Assent:
1. An agreement made by parties who are all acting for business purposes.
2. An agreement to suspend or extend a limitation period.'
4
With the ink barely dry on this volume, a postscript may soon be
in order.
Apart from the problem of keeping up with current events, collec-
tions of this kind have some inherent limitations (no pun intended).
11. R. John Cameron, "New Limitation Periods - Contracting in Ontario" in Ontario
Limitations Regime, at p. 92.
12. The volume does contain an article by John Lee, Policy Counsel with Ontario's
Ministry of the Attorney General, entitled "Developing a New Limitations Act: A
Survey of Canada's Emerging Limitations Regime", but he does not explore the pur-
poses animating s. 22 and indicates that his contribution represents his views alone and
not those of the ministry or the government.
13. J. Ziegel, "Consumer Aspects of the Limitations Act, 2002", in Ontario Limitations
Regime, at pp. 139-41.
14. Bill 14, 2nd Sess, 38th Leg., Ontario, 2005, First Reading, Sch. D.
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While the essays reflect a constructive engagement with shared
concerns (for example, the desire for certainty and consistency), they
could cohere more effectively if more attention had been paid to trim-
ming duplication. This is particularly apparent with respect to s. 22,
which is the subject of several critiques, none of which appears to
build on the others. Some of the essays are quite sophisticated in their
analytic rigour; others are short and descriptive. Another concern is
the dominant focus on commercial concerns animating the volume.
The authors mostly hail from commercial backgrounds and the vol-
ume arose out of a seminar involving the Canadian Business Law
Journal and a number of leading commercial law firns, so it is nei-
ther surprising nor unjustified that the various essays address mostly
commercial concerns - does the legislation, for example, address
the concerns of the real estate business? Will it allow Ontario to com-
pete for commercial contracts in a global economy?
A review of limitations jurisprudence of the last decade or so,
however, reveals that the most troubling and compelling limitations
disputes have emerged from non-commercial fields - the series of
suits against the Canadian government and Catholic Church for
abuses inflicted at residential schools against aboriginal youth is a
notable example.'5 Civil suits alleging childhood sexual assault is
another. 6 Environmental torts and reparations class actions might
also be added to this list. The new Act includes special provisions
exempting from limitation periods both child sexual assault litiga-
tion (s. 16) and some forms of environmental tort litigation (s. 17),
but these are subject only to passing references in the analyses. It
would have been helpful to hear more directly from these quarters
on the implications of the Act.
The attention to areas such as sexual abuse and environmental
harm reflects public interest perspectives on limitations regimes.
One challenge with law reform in the area of limitation periods is
how to properly discern the public interest. Frequently defendants
tend to have industry or sector lobbying organizations to make sub-
missions on legislation in the making, but the same is not true of
15. See the discussion in Z. Oxaal, "Removing that which was Indian from the Plaintiff:
Tort Recovery for Loss of Culture and Language in Residential Schools Litigation"
(2005), 68 Sask. L. Rev. 367.
16. McDonald v. Mombourquette (1996), 152 N.S.R. (2d) 109 (C.A.), leave to appeal to
S.C.C. refused [1997] 2 S.C.R. xi sub nom. M. (EW.) v. Mombourquette and M. (K.)
v. M. (H), supra, footnote 6. See also J. Mosher, "Challenging Limitation Periods:
Civil Claims by Adult Survivors of Incest"' (1994), 44 U.T L.J. 169.
2006]
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potential plaintiffs. With the possible exception of consumer
groups, people normally do not know that they may be plaintiffs
down the road. Who expects to slip on the sidewalk, be hit by a car
or be sexually assaulted? Governments must consider the interests
of such people even if they cannot be consulted as part of the legis-
lative process. Discerning the public interest in limitation periods
raises the larger question of the public interest in civil litigation in
the first place. Is the role of legislation in this field to ensure fair-
ness to all parties, or the most efficient and effective system of
dispute resolution, or to promote the health of the market economy,
or ensure the protection of the vulnerable, or some combination of
these and other goals? Determining how best to fashion limitation
periods must flow from this broader sense of purpose or purposes.
The new legislation (and the analysis of it in this volume) assumes
that the public interest in limitation periods is self-evident. No
justification is given, for example, as to why the basic limitation
period for most civil litigation on debts or torts is shifting from six
to two years. No normative principles are offered to underlie the
need for an ultimate limitation period (in the Ontario legislation it
is 15 years, but why 15 and not 10, 20 or 100?).
In Novak v. Bond, 7 the Supreme Court of Canada considered
the B.C. limitations legislation in the context of a woman recov-
ering from breast cancer who did not file a claim until four years
after the expiry of the limitation period because her decision to
sue depended in her mind on the success of her recovery. In that
case, the majority offers the following account of modernizing
limitation statutes:
The result of this legislative and interpretive evolution is that most limitations
statutes may now be said to possess four characteristics. They are intended to:
(1) define a time at which potential defendants may be free of ancient obliga-
tions, (2) prevent the bringing of claims where the evidence may have been
lost to the passage of time, (3) provide an incentive for plaintiffs to bring suits
in a timely fashion, and (4) account for the plaintiff's own circumstances, as
assessed through a subjective/objective lens, when assessing whether a claim
should be barred by the passage of time. To the extent they are reflected in the
particular words and structure of the statute in question, the best interpretation
of a limitations statute seeks to give effect to each of these characteristics. 8
It is the fourth and last factor, that of accounting for the plain-
tiff's own contextual circumstances, which injects the search for
17. [1999] 1 S.C.R. 808, 172 D.L.R. (4th) 385.
18. Ibid. at para. 67, per McLachlin J. (as she then was).
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justice into the need for bright lines. As Kent Roach has persua-
sively demonstrated, where courts are given the opportunity to
replace bright line tests with contextual analyses, the result will
almost always benefit plaintiffs.19 In this way, courts are left through
the devices of statutory interpretation to fill in the normative gaps
left by overly broad or vague limitations statutes.
In fairness, and as the reader may have already surmised, I
myself am an outlier in debates on limitations periods. I have
never been persuaded the injustices to which limitation periods
inevitably give rise are compensated for by the policy rationales
of repose or removing the sword of Damocles from over the heads
of potential defendants. A wrong is a wrong. A wrong yesterday
ought to be treated as a wrong today. It is often said that potential
plaintiffs should not "sleep on their rights"." Maybe this is so, but
just as often, in my view, disputes such as that in Novak take time
to ripen and time is needed for potential plaintiffs to determine
whether the effect of a civil wrong on their life or livelihood jus-
tifies the uncertainty, cost and delay of a civil action.2' In some
cases of equally resourced and sophisticated commercial
litigants, there is some logic to well advertised and well under-
stood limitation periods in order to add certainty and predictability
in commercial affairs. In the preponderance of cases, however,
which involve power and informational imbalances, limitation
19. K. Roach, "Reforming Statutes of Limitation" (2001), 50 U.N.B. L.J. 25.
20. See Novak v. Bond, supra, footnote 17, at para. 8, per lacobucci and Major JJ. dissenting:
Almost all applications of limitations statutes will seem harsh. But their finality
should not obscure their value. They bring needed stability to society by enabling
potential defendants to plan their affairs in the safe assumption that stale claims can-
not be raised against them. They minimize the risk that evidence relevant to the
claim will be lost. In addition, they are an incentive for plaintiffs not to "sleep on
their rights".
21. The court in Novak addressed this concern (ibid., at para. 18) by reading in a subjec-
tive test to the discoverability principle in the B.C. legislation:
There are always reasons why a plaintiff may reasonably choose not to bring an
action, even though it would also be reasonable to bring an action. Lawsuits are try-
ing, financially, emotionally and perhaps physically. Often the game is not worth the
candle. The decision whether to sue or not is a personal one that each plaintiff must
make individually. The statute of limitations foresees this by allowing a two-year
period from the moment a potential plaintiff becomes reasonably able to sue. It is
during that time that the plaintiff's subjective position is considered - not by the
courts, but by the plaintiff herself in deciding whether to sue or not.
This description of the legislation comes from the dissent. The majority did not dis-
agree but simply interpreted the subjectivity of this standard differently, in a fashion
more sympathetic to plaintiffs.
20061
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periods sacrifice justice for efficiency and this is rarely a palatable
calculation - at least in my view.
Iacobucci and Major JJ. in their dissenting reasons in Novak note
that interpreting a provision of the B.C. legislation in a way that has
the effect of abolishing a limitation period is an "equal injustice" to
an absolute limitation period that admits of no exception. I find this
view puzzling. A limitation period is not like a rule of discovery or
evidence in which both parties must abide by whatever constraints
are imposed by the court. With limitation periods, the issue is no
more and no less than whether a party that is allegedly wronged will
have its day in court and whether a party that has done the wrong
should be exempted from the threat of liability simply because of
the passage of time. With respect, the injustice of being denied your
day in court is not the same as the injustice (if any) of being told
that your wrongful actions may have consequences notwithstanding
that they took place in the past. The majority reasons in Novak
reflect a healthy judicial disinclination to apply limitation periods
where it would be unjust to do so.
While this volume does not do justice to these broader ques-
tions of the public interest (its subject is the narrower one of
whether the new Ontario legislation should be lauded or lament-
ed), it does represent as reasoned and nuanced a discussion on the
subject of limitation principles as I have come across. The subject
of limitation periods attracts too few legal scholars. Those who do
explore the issue tend to do so in largely descriptive contexts. This
volume promises more and delivers on that promise admirably.
Hopefully, this book will find a wide audience and spark a wide-
ranging debate.
Lome Sossin*
* Faculty of Law, University of Toronto.
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